基于集市型水权交易模型的报价行为  

Bidding behavior in an optimal water trading model

作　　者：郑航[1] 陈奔[1] 林木[2] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学水利水电工程系,北京100084 [2]中央财经大学统计与数学学院,北京100081

出　　处：《清华大学学报（自然科学版）》2017年第4期351-356,共6页Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(51479089;51323014);水利部公益性行业科研专项(201401031);甘肃省水利厅科技计划项目;水利科学与水利水电工程国家重点实验室自主研究课题(2014-KY-04)

摘　　要：水权交易是水资源使用权通过市场机制进行优化配置的重要方式,是水权制度建设的落脚点。该文以源于澳大利亚的集市型水权交易实践为基础,构建了水权交易的数学模型,对集市中交易者的报价行为进行了分析和研究。首先,基于交易风险和收益平衡,计算市场中交易者的综合收益,得出了集市型交易模式下参与者的最优报价策略,给出了报价策略与用水效益及预期报价的函数关系;其次,通过对比拆分订单报价的策略性行为对交易者综合收益的影响,分析了该报价行为的可行性和合理性,发现"拆单"可以有效利用市场机制,实现个人收益最大化;最后,通过求解买家博弈的均衡报价,发现增加信息披露有利于交易者报价更加接近其对水权的真实估价,提升了市场价格发现的有效性。模型分析和结论对中国水权交易制度建设提供了一定的参考。China is developing its water rights drawing system based on water trading which is an important method to optimize allocations through the market mechanism.This article describes the mathematical model for pooled water trading and analyzes trader bidding behavior in the market.The trader income is also calculated based on balancing the trading risk and benefit.The best bidding strategy is selected to give the optimal income.Split bidding was also analyzed to show that split bidding increases the trader income.Furthermore,the effect of information transparency was also studied by solving for the game equilibrium between buyers with the result showing that increasing information disclosure improves the price discovery effectiveness in the market.

关 键 词：水权交易 集市 报价行为 信息 

分 类 号：F407.9[经济管理—产业经济]