地方政府财政支出策略互动行为研究  

Strategic Interaction of Fiscal Expenditure of Local Government

作　　者：王俏[1] 

机构地区：[1]首都经济贸易大学经济学院,北京100070

出　　处：《首都经济贸易大学学报》2017年第3期21-28,共8页Journal of Capital University of Economics and Business

摘　　要：通过构建地方政府财政支出的完全信息静态无序离散型博弈模型,并对此博弈模型进行非参数估计,实证分析地方政府财政支出的策略互动行为及此策略互动行为对区域经济协调发展的影响。结果表明:地方政府财政支出在公共服务和正外溢效应比较大的领域,如教育、科学技术、文化体育与传媒、节能环保和金融监管的策略互动行为是策略替代的,在搭便车心理的影响下,这些领域地方政府财政支出的增加不利于区域经济的协调发展;而地方政府财政支出在公共安全和外溢效应比较小的领域,如医疗卫生、城乡社区事务、农林水事务和交通运输的策略互动行为是策略互补的;在协同发展的情况下,这些领域地方政府财政支出的增加会促进区域经济的协调发展。This paper constructs an unordered static discrete model of complete information with nonparametric estimation for fiscal expenditure of local governments,and empirically analyzes the strategic interaction of fiscal expenditure of local governments and the influence on regional economic balanced development.The results show that fiscal expenditure of local governments on public services,education,technology,culture,environment protection and financial regulation are strategic substitute;and increasing fiscal expenditure on these fields will prevent regional economic balanced development.However,fiscal expenditure of local governments on public security,medical care,communities,agriculture and transportation are strategic complement;and increasing fiscal expenditure on these fields will promote regional economic balanced development.

关 键 词：财政支出 策略互动行为 非参数估计 协调发展 

分 类 号：F810.45[经济管理—财政学]