基于合作博弈的PPP项目控制权配置  

Control Rights Allocation within PPP Project Based on Cooperative Game Model

作　　者：陈菡[1] 陈少华[2] 

机构地区：[1]厦门国家会计学院教研中心,福建厦门361005 [2]厦门大学管理学院会计系/会计发展研究中心,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《福建商学院学报》2017年第2期33-40,共8页Journal of Fujian Business University

基　　金：福建省社会科学规划项目"PPP项目再融资交易结构设计与风险分配研究"(FJ2015C122)

摘　　要：控制权的合理配置是提高PPP项目运行效率的重要因素。基于合作博弈理论探讨PPP项目的实施框架,认为:PPP项目控制权配置是项目缔约方讨价还价的结果;缔约方的讨价还价能力受其所持有的生产要素可替代程度、要素市场供应量、对风险的敏感度的影响,从而影响其享有的控制权大小;私人部门的讨价还价能力还会受到其投入的专用性资产水平的高低及对项目整体收益的影响,从而影响私人部门所享有的控制权。The rational allocation of controlrights is an important factor to improve the operating efficiency of PPP project. Under the framework of cooperative game theory, this article makes the following conclusion： control rights allocation within PPP project is the outcome of bargaining between contractors, whose bargaining power is determined by the substitutable degree of production factors, market supply of production factors, and risk sensitivity on the con- tractors, thus affects their control rights, bargaining power of the private sector will also be affected by the level of specific assets and an overall revenue of the project, thus affecting control rights enjoyed by the private sector.

关 键 词：PPP模式 合作博弈 控制权配置 讨价还价能力 专用性资产 

分 类 号：F019[经济管理—政治经济学]