任人唯亲还是任人唯贤--来自北京市文化创业企业的证据  

MERITOCRACY OR NEPOTISM IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE——Evidence from Cultural Start-up Enterprises in Beijing

作　　者：江艇[1] 方明月[1] 李海龙[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学经济学院 [2]首都经济贸易大学经济学院

出　　处：《经济理论与经济管理》2017年第4期72-81,共10页Economic Theory and Business Management

基　　金：北京市自然科学基金青年项目(9154025);中国人民大学新教师启动金项目(2016030032);北京市优秀人才项目的资助

摘　　要：在中国传统文化和市场经济的双重环境下,企业在治理结构上是"任人唯亲"还是"任人唯贤"一直是一个存在争议的问题。从公司治理实践上看,两种治理模式各有优劣。那么,企业在什么情况下更可能"任人唯亲"呢?本文基于最优授权理论提出了一个理论框架,然后使用一个独特的创业企业调查数据,采取计量经济学方法进行了实证检验。本文的主要发现是:有创业经历的或文化水平低的企业主更愿意任用亲戚担任企业高管,而男性、有管理学背景或有银行贷款的企业主更不愿意任用亲戚担任企业高管。本文的研究结论对于当前"大众创业、万众创新"政策具有重要的理论意义。It has been long debated whether corporate governance in China should be more structured toward meritocracy or nepotism in a market economy that is deeply embedded in the traditional culture. From a practical point of view, these two governance models have their respective pros and cons. Thus a more relevant question to ask is that under what circumstances an entrepreneur will recruit partners on their merit. In this paper we propose an analytical framework based on the theory of optimal delegation and put it to an empirical test using a unique survey data set on start-up enterprises. We find that entrepreneurs with former entrepreneurial experience or low education levels prefer to employ relatives （nepotism）, while male entrepreneurs with an educational background in management who get loans from banks tend not to appoint relatives to management （meritocracy）. These results have implications for the promotion of popular entrepreneurship and innovation.

关 键 词：任人唯亲 任人唯贤 创业 高管 

分 类 号：G124[文化科学]