实际权力结构与地方政府行为:理论模型与实证研究  

Real Political Power Structure and Local Government Behavior:Theory and Empirical Study

作　　者：梁平汉[1] 高楠[2] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学中国公共管理研究中心,政治与公共事务管理学院 [2]中南财经政法大学文澜学院

出　　处：《经济研究》2017年第4期135-150,共16页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金2015年青年科学基金项目(基金项目号:71503208)的资助

摘　　要：本文研究了地方政府内部利益分化和实际权力结构对于政府行为的影响。我们首先构建了一个政府内存在分工时的最优授权模型,推导出部门间的利益偏差会扭曲政府政策,而实际权力结构会放大效率损失。基于省委常委会内部组成情况,我们构建了利益分化指标来衡量地方领导班子内部的利益偏差和实际权力结构。基于1992—2011年的省级面板数据的实证研究表明,平均而言,如果省委常委会分化指标增加1个标准差,则次年该省公共部门人员规模增加1%,民营经济投资降低4.4个百分点,同时,次年该省土地违法面积增加12.5%。这表明利益分化通过实际权力结构使政府行为和政策更加偏向"内部人",导致政府从市场经济中攫取更多资源,降低了资源配置效率。因此,加强制度建设,约束政府权力,促进决策过程的公开透明是全面深化改革,推动经济发展的需要。The decentralized authoritarism that combines political centralization and economic decentralization is considered as an important factor underlying China＇s remarkable economic growth over the past four decades. In this framework, the central government provides strong incentives to local government officials to stimulate economic development, and local government officials respond by encouraging investment. The local government plays the role of providing a helping hand. Although a political structure is centralized at the highest level of government, many political science researchers point out that decision making in local governments and government branches is becoming increasingly fragmented. Various divisions take into account their own divisional interests, and cronyism becomes a serious challenge. In the context of streamlining administration and restricting executives to promote comprehensively deepening reform, it is important to remove the-interference and obstacles from vested interest groups. In this paper, we set up an optimal delegation model following Holmstrom （1984） , in which a government consists of two divisions. We mainly focus on the consequences of interest divergence between divisions. The model indicates that larger interest divergence is associated with organizational efficiency loss, which increases with respect to the importance of the division. Examining the model predictions empirically, the interest divergence biases government policy through the real political power structure, which represents the importance of division in the model. The model implies that in the absence of external monitoring and under the principle of collective leadership, the interest divergence based on the divisions may affect policymaking through the real political power structure. Therefore, government policy could be biased toward government insiders, which would cause more interference in the market economy and reduce the social welfare. We manually collect information on provincial party standi

关 键 词：实际权力结构 政府行为 政府规模 土地财政 

分 类 号：D630[政治法律—政治学]