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作 者:杨兴夏[1]
机构地区:[1]山西财经大学国际贸易学院,山西太原030031
出 处:《改革与战略》2017年第4期147-150,共4页Reformation & Strategy
基 金:2014年山西财经大学青年科研基金项目"煤电一体化产业链稳定机制研究"(项目编号:QN-2014001)
摘 要:坑口电厂是政府鼓励的电厂布局,也是电力企业青睐的选址。文章以产业经济学理论为指导,从我国电力政府定价的实际出发,构建煤电纵向关系的动态博弈模型,探讨电力企业主导的坑口电厂纵向关系安排。结果表明,上下游市场结构及政府制定的电力价格是影响该纵向关系安排的重要因素,也是电力企业在选择纵向关系及政府改革纵向关系时需要考虑的因素。Pithead power plant is the desiring mode advocated by the government and also the desiring address of power enterprise. In line with industrial economics theory, this thesis commences from current power Government Pricing to build up a dynamic game model for analyzing vertical arrangement of pithead power plant in China. Research consequences indicate that the structure of upstream and downstream markets and the electricity price adjusted by the government are two important factors influencing such vertical relationship arrangement. At the same time, these are considerations during the vertical arrangement by pithead power plant and the progress of advancing vertical arrangement reform by the government.
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