在线增价拍卖中跳跃式报价的实证研究  

Empirical Research of Jump Bidding in Online Ascending Auction

作　　者：叶文 詹文杰[1] 邹轶[2] 杨洁[3] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学管理学院,武汉430074 [2]浙江工商大学管理工程与电子商务学院,杭州310018 [3]武汉纺织大学会计学院,武汉430200

出　　处：《管理评论》2017年第4期83-90,共8页Management Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71640020);湖北省人文社会科学重点研究基地现代信息管理研究中心资助(2013WZ005)

摘　　要：跳跃式报价是增价拍卖中的一个有趣现象,国外学者对该报价行为分别给出了信号传递、缺乏耐性和策略性出价等三种不同的模型进行解释。本文选取其中的前两种解释模型为理论基础,以淘宝拍卖会中出现的跳跃式报价现象为研究对象,从跳跃时机、跳跃幅度以及竞争程度等三个方面进行实证分析。结果表明:我国网络消费者的跳跃时机呈现出规律性的"J型"分布,这一现象不完全符合信号传递模型和缺乏耐性模型的解释;而跳跃幅度以及竞争程度的影响总体上符合上述两种模型的解释。本研究检验了跳跃式报价的两种经典解释模型在中国情境下的适用性,并为网络消费者进行跳跃式报价提供决策依据。Jump bidding is an interesting phenomenon in an ascending auction. Overseas scholars have provided signaling model,impatience model and strategic models to explain the behaviour. Based on the former two models,this paper empirically studies jump bidding behaviours in ascending auctions of Taobao from three aspects. They are the timing of jump bidding,the magnitude of bid increase and the effect of competition level on jump. The results show that the timing of jump bidding is regularly distributed as＂J＂type,which does not confirm the explanations of both signaling and impatience models. However,the magnitude of bid increase and the effect of competition satisfy the explanations of the two models on the whole. This paper examines the applicability of two classic models in the situation of China,and provides decision support for Chinese online consumers who want to give jump bidding.

关 键 词：跳跃式报价 在线增价拍卖 信号传递 缺乏耐性 

分 类 号：F724.6[经济管理—产业经济] F724.59