支配企业折扣滥用行为的反垄断研究——基于美国、欧盟执法经验  

Antitrust research on discount abuse of dominant corporates——From the law enforcement evidence of US and EU

作　　者：唐要家[1] 司少杰 

机构地区：[1]浙江财经大学经济学院

出　　处：《价格理论与实践》2017年第2期35-38,共4页Price:Theory & Practice

基　　金：浙江省自然科学基金项目:"公用事业用户差别定价经济效应评价及监管改革研究"(LY16G03011)

摘　　要：折扣滥用行为是反垄断执法面临的新的重要问题。支配企业的折扣滥用行为既有促进竞争效应,也会产生市场封锁效应。非法折扣滥用行为的反垄断审查依据是反竞争封锁理论,反垄断审查方法应采用同等效率竞争者检验。为有效规制价格折扣等滥用行为,我国应尽早制定《滥用行为反垄断指南》,明确反垄断执法理论依据、执法原则和审查方法。Discount abuse is a new important problem facing antitrust enforcement. Not only can discount abuse of dominant corporates promote competition ef- fect, but also can produce market blockade effect. The antitrust censoring of ille- gal discount abuse is based on anticompetitive competition blockade theory, equal efficiency competitors test should be adopted in antitrust censoring. To regulate abuses such as price discount effectively, our country should formulate the An- titrust Guide on Abuse as soon as possible, clearing the theoretical evidence about law enforcement on antitrust, principles of law enforcement and ways of censoring.

关 键 词：折扣滥用 反竞争封锁 同等效率竞争者检验 反垄断 

分 类 号：D996[政治法律—经济法学]