财政透明度对企业产能过剩的影响研究——基于“主观”与“被动”投资偏误的视角  

The Influence of Fiscal Transparency on Enterprise Excess Capacity:From the Perspective of Subjective and Passive Investment Bias

作　　者：邓淑莲[1] 朱颖[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学公共经济与管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《财经研究》2017年第5期4-17,共14页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(11BZZ061);上海财经大学研究生创新基金项目(CXJJ-2016-39)

摘　　要：文章把地方政府的财政透明度纳入企业微观行为的分析体系,根据《2012年中国市级政府财政透明度研究报告》和《2012年世界银行中国企业调查数据》等统计资料,实证检验了财政透明度对企业产能过剩的两种影响机制——企业"主观"投资偏误形成机理和"被动"投资偏误形成机理。研究发现:(1)财政透明度的提高会增加企业对政府行为的理性预期,减少其对外部经营环境的不确定性判断,抑制了企业由于"主观"投资偏误而导致的产能利用率低下、产能过剩现象;(2)财政透明度的提高增加了政府干预土地要素市场的成本,继而减少了企业因政府干预土地要素市场而产生的"被动"投资偏误,产能利用率提高。This paper incorporates fiscal transparency of local governments into analytical system of enterprise micro behavior,and empirically tests two mechanisms of the effect of fiscal transparency on enterprise excess capacity,namely subjective and passive investment bias formation mechanisms,according to statistical information like a study of fiscal transparency of China＇s municipal governments in 2012 and the World Bank survey of Chinese enterprises in 2012.It comes to the results as follows：firstly,the increase in fiscal transparency results in the rise in enterprises＇ rational expectations of government behavior,the reduction in uncertainty judgment of external business environment,and the inhibition on low capacity utilization and excess capacity resulting from enterprise subjective investment bias;secondly,the increase in fiscal transparency leads to the rise in costs of government intervention on land factor market,then reduces enterprise passive investment bias resulting from government intervention on land factor market,and increases capacity utilization.

关 键 词：财政透明度 土地资源获取 产能过剩 

分 类 号：F810[经济管理—财政学] F270.3