政府补贴下制造/再制造竞争机理研究  

Competition mechanism of manufacture/remanufacture considering government subsidies

作　　者：夏西强[1] 朱庆华[2] 赵森林[3] 

机构地区：[1]郑州大学商学院,郑州450001 [2]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200030 [3]上海海事大学经济管理学院,上海201306

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2017年第4期71-83,共13页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(71632007);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71472021);国家重点基础研究发展计划资助课题(2011CB013406);国家社会科学基金重大资助项目(13&ZD147);国家自然科学青年基金资助项目(71301150)

摘　　要：以政府"以旧换再"补贴政策为背景,建立了原始制造商、再制造商与零售商两阶段博弈模型.基于此博弈模型,考虑政府不采取补贴政策、政府补贴给再制造商及政府通过零售商补贴购买再制造产品消费者3种情况,对比分析了政府不同补贴策略对两种产品单位批发价格、零售价格、销售量、利润、消费者剩余及环境的影响.结果表明:当再制造产品的需求不受废旧产品回收量限制,政府补贴可以降低两种产品单位零售价格,增加再制造商和零售商的利润,提高消费者的剩余;当再制造产品的需求受到废旧产品回收量限制时,政府补贴可以增加两种产品的单位批发价格和两种产品制造商的利润,但是会降低零售商的销售利润.The game model between an original equipment tablished considering government subsidies for ＂exchanging manufacturer （OEM） and a remanufacturer is esthe old with a remanufactured one＂. The effects of three different policies - no government subsidy at all, government subsidizing the remanufacturer, government subsidizing the consumers of remanufactured products - on the wholesale prices, retail prices, sales volume, profit, consumer surplus, and environments are compared and analyzed. The results are： when the demand for remanufactured products is not limited to recycled used products, government subsidies could reduce the unit retail price for the two products, increase the profits of remanufacturers and retailers, and raise consumer surplus; when the demand of remanufactured products is limited to recycled used products, government subsidy could increase the wholesale price of the two products and the profit of OEM and remanufacturer, and reduce the retailer＇s sales profit.

关 键 词：政府补贴 原始制造商 再制造商 博弈模型 

分 类 号：F720[经济管理—产业经济]