真与超越性——说谎者悖论的地位转变  

Truth and Transcendence——Turning the Table on the Liar Paradox

作　　者：吉拉.谢尔 刘靖贤[2] 

机构地区：[1]加利福尼亚大学圣迭戈分校哲学系 [2]辽宁大学哲学与公共管理学院

出　　处：《湖北大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2017年第3期21-33,共13页Journal of Hubei University(Philosophy and Social Science)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目:12A ZX 008;12A ZD 072;15CZX 035

摘　　要：传统观念认为,只有解决说谎者悖论才能发展真理论,但事实并非如此,实质内容比形式上的一致性问题更重要。实质真理论以实质主义为导向,采用基础整体主义方法论,重点关注认知和认识。真的实质原则体现为内蕴性论题及其三个构成原则,包括内在性、超越性和规范性,内蕴性论题可以限制等价原则并且阻止说谎者悖论。说谎者悖论的塔斯基式解决方案以及克里普克式解决方案可以从内在性与超越性互补的角度得到重新审视。Traditional conception of truth suggests that confrontation of the Liar Paradox is a prerequisite for developing a theory of truth.But material content is more important than formal consistency.Substantive theory of truth has the following features:a substantivist orientation,a foundational-holistic methodology and a focus on the cognitive-epistemic role of truth.Immanence thesis is one of the material principles of truth,which has three sub-principles:immanence,transcendence and normativity.The equivalence principle is constrained and the Liar Paradox is banned by the immanence thesis.Tarski’s and Kripke’s solutions to the Liar Paradox are reconsidered in terms of the immanence-transcendence complementarity.

关 键 词：真 说谎者悖论 实质真理论 内蕴性 

分 类 号：B81[哲学宗教—逻辑学]