无政府激励的绿色供应链管理的可行性分析  

A feasibility analysis for practicing green supply chain management without government policy incentives

作　　者：曹裕[1] 刘子豪[1] CAO Yu LIU Zi-hao(School of Business, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China)

机构地区：[1]中南大学商学院,湖南长沙410083

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2017年第2期119-127,共9页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：湖南省自然科学基金重点资助项目(12JJ2042);国家创新群体科学基金资助项目(70921001);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71272067);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71171202)

摘　　要：为研究在信息不对称下,无政府激励的供应链主动实施绿色供应链管理的可行性,建立了三级供应链的非合作博弈模型(各自决策的Leader-follower模型和局部联盟决策的Stackelberg模型)和引入收益共享合约的合作决策模型。通过三个模型之间的对比,证明了信息不对称下合作决策的优越性。此外,通过分析供应链实施绿色供应链的各种驱动因素(初始市场份额,普通产品价格,绿色成本等),以及各种驱动因素下不同博弈模型之间的对比。进一步验证了合作决策的优越性,并发现局部联盟决策时渠道的收益并不总是优于各自决策时的收益。最后,发现在具有竞争特性的市场上,供应链实施绿色供应链管理具有可行性,且合作博弈时供应链在起积极作用的驱动因素影响下会率先实施绿色供应链管理,在起消极作用的驱动因素影响下会延后放弃绿色供应链管理。Green supply chain has attracted increasing attention since the 21st century because of continuous global environment deterioration and lack of natural resources. Consumers＇ environmental and health awareness are increasing because international environment and quality standards are becoming stricter. Given these trends, it is inevitable that supply chains will be interested in their green levels and learning about how to implement green supply chain management （GSCM）. At present in China, game analysis on the implementation of green supply chain management has not addressed the following questions comprehensively： （1） too much emphasis is placed on the role of government will bring additional cost and further influence the whole social welfare, （2） game models are mostly established by assuming complete information, whereas in reality the information each one owns is often asymmetric, and （3） the comparison between cooperative and non-cooperative decision making in multi-stage supply chains is insufficient. In view of the abovementioned problems, this article attempts to compare cooperative decision making and non-cooperative decision making in a green supply chain, and then further analyzes the drivers influencing the feasibility of implementing green chain management without government policy incentives. Specifically, this paper models a three-level supply chain with a supplier, a manufacturer and a retailer. The first part of this paper establishes three game models considering no government policy incentives and information asymmetry： the non-cooperative Three-level Leader-follower Game （TLG）, Stackelberg Model （SG） involving the alliance of the supplier and the manufacturer, and Cooperative Decision Game （CDG） with a revenue sharing contract. By solving and analyzing the three game models, we find that when information asymmetry exists, the revenue of the whole channel under cooperation is always greater than that under noncooperation. Moreover, the revenue of each member

关 键 词：信息不对称 博弈模型 收益共享合约 绿色供应链管理 

分 类 号：F253[经济管理—国民经济]