碳排放交易机制下政府补贴的供应链减排博弈分析  

Game Analysis on Carbon Emission Reduction on Supply Chain Considering Government Subsidies under Carbon Cap-and-Trade System

作　　者：刘小兰[1] 杨军[1] 王清蓉[1] LIU Xiaolan YANG Jun WANG Qingrong(Faculty of Transportation Engineering, Kunming University of Science and Technology, Kunming 650500, Yunnan, Chin)

机构地区：[1]昆明理工大学交通工程学院,云南昆明650500

出　　处：《昆明理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2017年第2期73-82,共10页Journal of Kunming University of Science and Technology(Social Sciences)

基　　金：昆明理工大学引进人才科研启动基金项目"碳排放约束下竞争供应链绩效分析"(KKSY201502035)

摘　　要：针对碳交易机制下由单制造商和单零售商构成的二级供应链中,不同政府补贴策略的供应链最优碳减排问题开展了研究,进而探讨了消费者需求量反映系数、碳排放上限、制造商减排成本系数、零售商低碳推广成本系数以及政府补贴率对供应链Stackelberg博弈时制造商最优碳减排水平、制造商和零售商最优利润以及最优地区经济效益的影响。研究表明:消费者具有低碳偏好时,制造商进行低碳技术研发、零售商进行低碳产品推广以及政府进行补贴可同时提高制造商碳减排水平和增加企业利润;政府补贴制造商具有更好的碳减排效果,但需合理设置碳排放上限和补贴率以获得更大的地区经济效益。The optimal carbon emission reduction for different government subsidies strategies under carboncap - and - trade system is discussed in a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. The in-fluence of consumer＇ s demand reflection coefficients, carbon emission cap, manufacturer＇ s carbon emission re-duction cost coefficient, retailer＇ s low - carbon promotion coefficient and government subsidy rate on manufac-turer optimal level of carbon emission reduction, manufacturer and retailer optimal profits and optimal economicbenefit is studied in Stackelberg game as well. The results show that when a consumer＇ s willingness paying forlow carbon product depends on carbon emissions, manufacturer investing carbon reduction technology, retailerdoing low -carbon promotion and government carrying out subsidies could improve both manufacturer level ofcarbon emission reduction and profits of manufacturer and retailer. Furthermore, manufacturer getting govern-ment subsidies has a better carbon emission reduction; however, reasonable carbon emission cap and subsidyrate should be set for greater economic benefit.

关 键 词：节能减排 政府补贴 碳限额 碳交易 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F424.7[经济管理—产业经济]