基于消费偏好的供应链上下游联合减排协调契约博弈模型  

Supply chain upstream and downstream joint coordination contract game model based on consumer preference

作　　者：王一雷[1] 朱庆华[1] 夏西强[1] 

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学管理与经济学部,辽宁大连116024

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2017年第2期188-198,共11页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家杰出青年科学基金资助项目(71025002);国家重点基础研究发展计划资助项目(2011CB013406);国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(71033004);国家社会科学基金重大资助项目(13&ZD147)

摘　　要：供应链角度的碳减排问题受到了广泛的关注.在考虑消费者的低碳偏好对市场需求影响的基础上,建立了三种不同的契约模型,对供应链系统中制造商和零售商的联合减排机制及供应链利润协调问题开展了研究.分析结果表明,约束批发价格的成本分摊契约可以实现供应链利润的协调,并在一定条件下其减排效果最好;而批发价格契约和成本分摊契约不能实现供应链利润的协调,其中成本分摊契约在满足一定条件时其产品的碳减排水平最高.Carbon reduction from the the perspective of supply chains has received widespread attention. Con- sidering consumers＇ low-carbon preference that affects the market demand for a product, this paper establishes three different contract models, and studies the joint carbon emission reduction mechanism between a manu- facturer and a retailer in the supply chain system and the profit coordination of the supply chain. The analysis shows that the cost sharing contract under constraint wholesale price can coordinate the supply chain＇s profit effectively and results in the best carbon emission reduction under certain conditions, that the wholesale price contract and the cost sharing contract cannot coordinate the supply chain＇s profit, and that the cost sharing contract can result in the highest level of carbon emission reduction for a product when certain conditions are met.

关 键 词：供应链协调 联合减排 低碳偏好 契约模型 

分 类 号：F205[经济管理—国民经济]