A Cdtical Examination of Anselm＇s Ontological Argument  

作　　者：ZHANG Junguo 

机构地区：[1]UCD School of Philosophy, University College Dublin, Belfield, Dublin 4, Ireland

出　　处：《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2017年第1期137-150,共14页中国哲学前沿（英文版）

摘　　要：This paper argues that St. Anselm＇s distinction of the two senses of existence in his ontological argument for the existence of God renders Paul Tillich＇s refutation of it invalid. At the same time, Anselm misuses the two types of existence in his ontological comparison, leading to a logical contradiction between the different kinds and degrees of existence. Since Anselm＇s idea of different reference subjects does not coherently solve this logical absurdity, Anselm＇s ontological argument falls well short of being a successful approach to establishing the existence of God.This paper argues that St. Anselm＇s distinction of the two senses of existence in his ontological argument for the existence of God renders Paul Tillich＇s refutation of it invalid. At the same time, Anselm misuses the two types of existence in his ontological comparison, leading to a logical contradiction between the different kinds and degrees of existence. Since Anselm＇s idea of different reference subjects does not coherently solve this logical absurdity, Anselm＇s ontological argument falls well short of being a successful approach to establishing the existence of God.

关 键 词：ANSELM different reference subjects EXISTENCE ontological comparison Paul Tillich 

分 类 号：TP18[自动化与计算机技术—控制理论与控制工程]