小官何以巨腐——以土地征收补偿中的具体权力与抽象权力划分为例  

Why Petty Officials Rot——A Case Study on the Division of Abstract Power and Specific Power in Compensation of Land Expropriation

作　　者：徐晓波[1,2] XU Xiao - bo

机构地区：[1]华中师范大学湖北地方政府治理与地方发展研究中心 [2]安徽马鞍山市委党校

出　　处：《理论与改革》2017年第3期94-103,共10页Theory and Reform

基　　金：作者主持的教育部人文社科研究规划课题:基于协同理论的大城市边缘区治理成果(项目编号:15YJA630077)

摘　　要：小官巨腐可以用具体权力和抽象权力的划分来解释。目的的公益性、程序合法、补偿的公平性是土地征收的三个要件。研究发现:土地征收补偿中的抽象权力表现为——中央确定土地宪法秩序、省政府制定征地补偿标准,确定土地补偿和安置补偿的数额、市政府制定国有土地补偿办法、县政府授权委托乡镇政府制定集体土地补偿办法。考虑到地方性知识,抽象权力要在文本和情境中运行,尤其在抽象权力对于集体土地征收补偿出现空白的情况下,乡镇政府同时拥有抽象权力和具体权力,抽象权力失去对于具体权力的监督,从而出现权力的配置失衡。以案例研究中深描、显微的方法刻画出小官巨腐的原因。The reason that some junior - level officials corrupted hugely could be explained by the division of specific power and abstract power. Generally speaking, there are three key elements in land expropriation： public interests, legal procedures, fair compensation. Research finds that the abstract power in land expropriation com- pensation is manifested in following hierarchy： central government determines the constitutional order; provincial government develops land compensation standards and specifies the amount of land compensation and resettlement compensation ; municipal government stipulates the compensation of state - owned land ; county government authori- zes township government to formulate collective land compensation. With abstract power absenting in local context, especially in collective land expropriation compensation, township governments are left with both the abstract power and specific power. Since the abstract power loses its supervision over the specific power, corruption occurs. The paper delineates the reason that some junior -level officials corrupted hugely by using the methods of case study and microscopic description.

关 键 词：小官巨腐 抽象权力 具体权力 土地征收补偿 

分 类 号：D26[政治法律—政治学]