捕捞限额制度下主体行为的博弈分析  

Game Analysis of the Main Body Behavior under the Fishing Quota System

作　　者：陆佼[1] 杨正勇[1,2,3] 

机构地区：[1]上海海洋大学经济管理学院,上海201306 [2]中国水产养殖经济研究中心,上海201306 [3]海洋产业发展战略研究中心,上海201306

出　　处：《海洋开发与管理》2017年第4期98-104,共7页Ocean Development and Management

基　　金：农业部国家现代农业产业技术体系建设专项(CAR-50-G11)

摘　　要：为从根本上解决我国渔业资源急剧衰退的问题,渔业捕捞限额制度的实施迫在眉睫;该制度的本质是对人和船进行管理,各主体不同策略的选择对其实施效果产生直接影响。文章从捕捞限额制度实施的监管层面出发,构建三方静态博弈模型,研究渔业生产者、渔业监管者和其他渔业生产者的博弈规律;提出应尽快构建监管体系并在实施初期放宽对政府疏于监管的惩罚,建立高额举报奖励机制,设立合理罚款额度等建议,以期为我国渔业捕捞限额制度的推进和现代渔业综合试验改革提供参考。In order to fundamentally solve the deterioration of fishery resources,it＇s urgent to implement the fishing quota system.The nature of this system is management of people and ships. The paper focused on the supervision level of fishing quota models to study the game rules of fishery producers,fishery reg ers.Suggestions on building regulation system as soon as possib the lack of government＇s supervision in the beginning stage,esta ators and other fishery produc , lightening ishing high the punishment for public reporting re wards and setting up reasonable penalty system to provide the guide for the fishing quota system and modern fishery comprehensive test reform in China were also provided.

关 键 词：渔业捕捞限额制度 静态博弈 渔业生产者 渔业资源 

分 类 号：F316.4[经济管理—产业经济] P7[天文地球—海洋科学]