基于演化博弈的小额贷款公司运行机制研究  

Micro-credit Companies' Operating Mechanism Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

作　　者：车泰根[1] 庄新田[1] 苏艳丽[2] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110819 [2]沈阳师范大学国际商学院,辽宁沈阳110034

出　　处：《东北大学学报（自然科学版）》2017年第5期756-760,共5页Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71671030;71571038);辽宁省社科规划基金资助项目(L15BJY020)

摘　　要：通过建立小额贷款公司与小微企业演化博弈模型,研究小额贷款公司的运行机制.研究表明:在贷款方式上,小额贷款公司应经营担保贷款;在担保机制上,采取差额担保方式;在风险分类及识别上,以项目平均成功率、利率、担保率之间关系作为评判标准;在贷款指标上,对优质小微企业采用担保率区间管理,降低利率,对一般小微企业采取担保率、利率边界管理,实际值向上接近边界值;在外部政策上,通过政策降低第三方担保费率.By establishing the evolutionary game model for micro-credit companies and small and micro businesses,the operating mechanism of micro-credit companies was analyzed. It was found that in the patterns of lending,micro-credit companies should manage guaranteed loans; in the guarantee mechanism, micro-credit companies should adopt shortfall guarantee; in the risk classification and identification,the judgment criterion should be the relationship among average success rate,interest rate,and guarantee rate of small and micro businesses' investment projects;in the loan index,the high-quality small and micro businesses should be entitled to the interval management of guaranteed rates and reduced interest rates,while for the ordinary small and micro businesses the border management of guarantee and interest rates should be adopted,and the actual value should be up close to the boundary value; in the external policy,the third-party guarantee rates should be reduced through policy making.

关 键 词：小额贷款公司 小微企业 演化博弈 演化稳定策略 运行机制 

分 类 号：F830.5[经济管理—金融学]