构造与博弈:互联网监控的权力关系解构  

Logical Architecture and Dynamic Game:the Power Relations of Internet Surveillance

作　　者：师索[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]西南政法大学 [2]重庆市南岸区人民检察院

出　　处：《行政法学研究》2017年第3期86-97,共12页ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW

基　　金：2015年教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目"国家治理现代化视野中的犯罪治理模式研究"(1978-2013)(15YJS820085)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：基于互联网运行结构形成的监控体系在逻辑构造上由政治逻辑和经济逻辑构成。两种逻辑进路围绕政治逻辑形成了国家、商业组织与社会个体三方参与的权力关系。由于各方利益主张不同,权力关系时刻处于博弈之中。作为监控者,国家与商业组织会在绝大多数情境中采取合作策略,而在利益严重冲突时则转变为对抗策略。无论监控者之间采取何种策略,均将使作为被监控者的社会个体利益遭受损害,加剧了权力结构的不稳定性。国家为调和利益冲突,通过立法程序来确定各方在监控关系中的利益顺位。由于立法程序也将国家利益放在首位,而社会个体利益始终放在末尾,这种权力关系还将长期处于博弈状态中。Internet monitoring has become the most important monitoring way in the surveillance society. The logical structure of surveillance system which was based on Internet operational architecture is made up of political logic and economic logic. These two logic approaches have not formed independent power pole, but already formed a three-parties power relation among the state, commercial organizations and social individuals around the political logic. Due to their different respective interests, power relations are always under dynamic game. The state and commercial organizations will take cooperation strategy in most situations, while taking opposing strategy in serious interest conflict. Whatever strategies are taken by the monitors, interests of social individuals will eventually suffer damage, which aggravating the instability of power structure. In order to harmonize the interests of all parties in power relations, the state has to determine interests priority among the state, the commercial organizations and social individuals in the monitoring relationship throw legislation. Since the legislators always put interests of the state in the first place and put interests of social individuals in the last place, this power relations will still be in game for a long time.

关 键 词：互联网监控 逻辑构造 博弈 隐私权 利益顺位 

分 类 号：D912.1[政治法律—宪法学与行政法学]