第三方支付企业与商业银行的竞合关系研究  

An empirical study on the co-opetition betw een the third-party payment enterprises and the commercial banks

作　　者：郑迎飞 李楠 

机构地区：[1]上海对外经贸大学金融学院,上海201620

出　　处：《南京财经大学学报》2017年第2期53-61,共9页Journal of Nanjing University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71303153);上海市教育委员会科研创新重点项目(14ZS149);上海市教育委员会全英语示范性课程"Risk Management of Commercial Banks";上海市教育委员会重点课程"商业银行经营管理";上海对外经贸大学中东欧研究中心项目资助

摘　　要：首先检验梅特卡夫法则在第三方支付和网上银行交易上的适用性,结论表明第三方支付和网上银行各自的交易规模与其用户规模的平方数正相关,证实第三方支付和网银均激烈地争夺用户是有理论基础的。然后通过检验第三方支付和网上银行的交易规模之间的关系,发现第三方支付的交易规模促进了网上银行的交易规模,说明二者之间存在合作的基础。因此,研究结果支持二者应采用竞合战略的理论假设。建议二者通过共享资源开拓用户、合作实现优势互补,差异化定位以及采取股权合作等。This paper has tested the relationship between the user size and the volume of the transaction of the third-party payment and the online banking firstly,then it has confirmed that Metcalfe＇s law for both the third-party payment and the online banking are applicable, which is the theory base why the third-party payment and the online banking fiercely compete for users. Then through the test of the relationship between the third party payment and the online banking transactions, it is found that the third party payment transaction volume promotes the online banking transaction volume, which shows the basis of cooperation between the two. Therefore, the research results support the theoretical hypothesis that the two parties should adopt the strategy of co-opetition. It is suggested that the two share resources to develop the users, cooperate to achieve the advantages of comple- mentary, differentiate their positioning and take equity cooperation, etc.

关 键 词：第三方支付 商业银行 竞合 梅特卡夫法则 

分 类 号：F832.3[经济管理—金融学]