P2P网络借贷平台信用风险--博弈视角下声誉机制的混同均衡  

The credit risk of P2P online lending platform :pooling equilibrium of reputation mechanism from the perspective of game theory

作　　者：高觉民[1] 赵沁乐 

机构地区：[1]南京财经大学国际经贸学院,江苏南京210023

出　　处：《南京财经大学学报》2017年第2期96-108,共13页Journal of Nanjing University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(12BJY11

摘　　要：作为联结资金供求双方的信息中介,P2P平台的信用风险与其声誉水平密切相关,并存在声誉机制作用下的正向混同均衡性质。这个性质首先可以通过博弈方法进行理论证明,然后通过对国内5家P2P平台面板数据进行实证分析,得出声誉机制能持续有效地抑制平台的信用风险。最后提出成立P2P平台评级机构与确立行业评级标准、明确该行业准入和退出原则、加快国内的征信体系建设以及完善信息披露制度等相关政策建议。Together with the discussions of domestic and foreign scholars on the P2P platform credit risk and reputation theory, this paper argues that, as an information intermediary and a link between the capital supply and the demand, the P2P platforms＇ credit risk is closely related to their reputation and there is a positive pooling equilibrium under the action of the rep- utation mechanism. This nature can be proved through the method of game theory. It is concluded that the reputation mechanism can continue to suppress platform of credit risk effectively after the empirical analysis through the panel data of five domestic P2P platforms. Accordingly, the following policy suggestions are put forward in this paper： setting up the P2P platform rating a- gencies and establishing the industry rating standards, confirminging the industry access and exit principle, speeding up the con- struction of domestic credit system, perfecting the information disclosure system and so on.

关 键 词：P2P网络借贷平台 信用风险 声誉机制 混同均衡 

分 类 号：F832.4[经济管理—金融学]