中华帝国治理的“不可能三角”与治乱周期：从“风险论”出发  

Stability-Instability Cycle and Impossible Trinity in the Chinese Empires:A Perspective from Risk Governance

作　　者：尤怡文 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学社会学系 [2]浙江大学地方政府与社会治理研究中心

出　　处：《社会》2017年第3期85-102,共18页Chinese Journal of Sociology

摘　　要：本文由曹正汉提出的"风险论"出发,以威权政体政权存续的理论视角,探究中国治乱周期与统治者风险治理策略之间的关系,以及在治乱之间,统治者透过何种机制调节动态平衡以维系政权,又为何调节风险平衡机制在某些时候能奏效在另一时点上却失灵。藉由历史制度主义的时序分析,本文提出风险治理的"不可能三角",以解释治乱周期的波动,并发现风险调节机制之所以越到朝代后期越难奏效,肇因于开朝初期统治者为防制政变风险所采取的政治吸纳策略。这些策略随着时间演化及一连串反应序列后,破坏了统治者用来防治民变及外患风险的机制,并进一步弱化了国家的基础权力,导致国家能力下降,风险平衡机制失灵,从而陷入统治危机。This article proposes a new perspective on an old and great issue ： the stability-instability cycle in the Chinese Empires. It aims to unpuzzle the following questions： What is the relationship between stability-instability cycles and ruler strategy on risk governance？ What mechanism do rulers employ to balance between varied risks？ Why does the mechanism work well some of the time, but breaks down in another moment？ Upon examining the historical process in the Chinese Empires, we find that the evidence supports an alternative account, the impossible trinity of risk governance, to explain the stability-instability cycle. Three main risks, coup, revolution, and foreign invasion, challenged regime stability. Limited by fiscal capacity, it was almost impossible for rulers to deal with these three risks simultaneously. They only could manage two risks at the same time. This is the so-called impossible trinity of risk governance in the article. Usually, when rulers were engaged in governing the risk of coup and revolution, regimes were more stable. However, once the third risk, foreign invasion, appeared and created imbalance in fiscal distribution, regimes turn to instability. A common cycle of the stability-instability and risk governance model is as follows~ In the beginning of a dynasty, rulers place priority on governing the risk of revolution and coup. In order to pacify citizens who have suffered from the civil war, and to consolidate their regime, rulers reduce the tax burden on citizens and co-opt potential political challengers. This is usually the period of prosperity applauded by historians. Later, military actions for defense or expansion break down this stability. Rulers raise taxes for military expenditure and this induces resistance from citizens. This turns stability into instability. To maintain the power, rulers put a halt to military actions and turn to governing the risk of revolution and coup. This period of time is seen as a renaissance. Soon after, the next military action interrupts

关 键 词：威权政体政权存续 风险治理 政治吸纳 国家基础权力 

分 类 号：D691.2[政治法律—政治学]