双渠道闭环供应链博弈模型的动态定价研究  

Dynamic pricing strategies for double closed-loop supplychain game model

作　　者：马小林[1] 马帅宝 郭玉杰 

机构地区：[1]天津工业大学理学院,天津300387 [2]河南理工大学,河南焦作454000 [3]洛阳双瑞橡塑科技有限公司,河南洛阳471000

出　　处：《哈尔滨商业大学学报（自然科学版）》2017年第2期246-250,256,共6页Journal of Harbin University of Commerce：Natural Sciences Edition

摘　　要：建立了由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的双渠道闭环供应链的定价模型.模型中考虑了参考价格对决策的影响.数值模拟下分析了在静态博弈模型下渠道参数以及参考价格系数对定价决策的影响.同时,利用稳定域图、分岔图和最大Lyapunov指数图研究了动态模型的复杂动力学行为.结果表明,在渠道参数θ=0.97时,制造商和零售商达到相同利润;制造商利润均随着参考价格的增大而减小,而零售商利润随着参考价格的增大而增大.A pricing model for closed loop supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer has been established.The effects of reference price on the system decision-making were investigated.The effects of channel parameters and reference price coefficients on the price decision-making in static game model were also studied by numerical simulation method. The complex dynamic behaviors of the dynamic model were analyzed using the stable domain figure, bifurcation diagram and the maximum Lyapunov exponent diagram. The results showed that the manufacturer＇s profits decreasedas the reference price, while the retailer made more profit instead. The manufacturer and retailer can obtain the same profit when the channel parameters θ=0.97.

关 键 词：参考价格 双渠道 闭环供应链 博弈 混沌 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]