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机构地区:[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,四川成都611731
出 处:《科技进步与对策》2017年第5期135-141,共7页Science & Technology Progress and Policy
基 金:国家自然科学基金项目(70673008)
摘 要:风险投资机构通常持有一定数量的组合企业,而议价力和专业知识能力与最优组合企业数量间关系密切。将议价力和专业知识能力引入风险投资组合企业数量选择问题中,运用合作博弈与最优化理论方法,基于议价力和专业知识能力,建立决策模型并进行实证分析。研究发现,议价力和专业知识能力在风险投资组合企业数量确定过程中具有互补作用,专业知识能力强的机构会投资更多数量创业企业,而议价力决定了风险投资机构与创业企业间的利润分配结构,从而间接对组合企业数量产生非单调影响。模型一方面为风险投资机构根据自身情况和外部环境作出组合企业数量决策提供了理论依据;另一方面,从与以往研究不同的视角阐释了风险投资组合企业数量与利润分配结构间的关系。Venture capital(VC)tend to hold a portfolio of enterprise in reality,the optimal portfolio size is closely related to the bargaining power and specialized knowledge of VC.Using cooperative game theory and optimization theory,we introduce the two factors of bargaining power and specialized knowledge in this paper and establish the decision-making model to analyze the effect of the two factors on the portfolio size decision problem.At the same time,we do an empirical test for our conclusions.It was found that the bargaining power and specialized knowledge to play a complementary role in decisionmaking of portfolio size.The specialized knowledge stronger VCs to invest a large number of start-up firms,and the bargaining power determines the profits share rule between VCs and start-ups directly,thereby non monotonic effect the portfolio size of start-ups indirectly.On the one hand,the model provides a method for VCs to choose the number of venture enterprise according to their circumstance;on the other hand,it explains the relationship between the portfolio size and the profit share rule from a different point of view compare with the previous studies.The introduction of bargaining power is the main reason causing the difference between previous studies and this article.
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