官员晋升制度转变、污染排放与企业生产——基于江苏省纺织和电子加工行业企业的数据分析  

Officials Evaluation System Transformation,Pollution Discharge and Enterprise Production——Based on Data of Industrial Enterprises of Jiangsu Province

作　　者：施建华[1] 曹林峰[1] 

机构地区：[1]盐城工业职业技术学院经贸管理学院,江苏盐城224005

出　　处：《江南大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2017年第3期106-112,共7页Journal of Jiangnan University：Humanities & Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学研究基金资助项目:基于创新协同理论的江苏大中型工业企业技术创新能力评价研究(项目编号:2016SJB630064)

摘　　要：地方政府官员晋升考核制度的改变使得政府与企业间的污染排放问题发生转变,污染企业不得不重新考虑生产模式,来应对环境规制带来的成本增加。本文选用调查得到的120家微观企业数据,分析地方政府官员因晋升制度转变对工业企业污染排放、产量、技术创新的影响,分析发现,地方政府官员态度转变会导致企业排污量的减少,同时会加大企业的技术创新。政府态度转变带来的影响在污染更为严重的纺织服装行业中更深,由此说明原先产值考核制度下环境污染问题的政企合谋是存在的,考核制度转变能解决一定程度的企业污染排放问题。Changes of local government official promotion system make the relationship of the pollution emissions between the government and enterprise change. Polluting enterprises have to reconsider their production mode to deal with the increase in cost caused by environmental regulation. This paper uses the data of 120 micro -enterprises to make an analysis of whether the change of local government official promotion system would affect pollution emissions, output and technical innovation. Th e results show that the change of government officials＇ attitude resulted in a decrease in the amount of sewage of the enterprise,enhanced the technical innovation as well. The effect is more evident in textile and garment industries whose pollution problems are more serious. It indicates that the collusion of the pollution problem between government and enterprises existed in the production value assessment system in the past, and the change of local government official promotion system can make a contribution to reducing enterprises＇ pollution emissions.

关 键 词：官员考核制度 企业污染排放 企业产量 技术创新 

分 类 号：F424.1[经济管理—产业经济]