基于非线性效应的第三方支付平台兼容性研究  

The Compatibility Decision of Third Party Payment Platform under the No-linear Utility Function

作　　者：孟东梅[1,2] 宋胜洲[2] 张海楠[2] 

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学,北京100029 [2]北方工业大学,北京100144

出　　处：《工业技术经济》2017年第5期109-116,共8页Journal of Industrial Technological Economics

基　　金：北京市教委科技发展基金"互联网金融平台企业的定价策略研究"(项目编号:SM201610009007)阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：本文在设定网络外部性效用为符合梅特卡夫法则的非线性函数条件下,构建双寡头支付平台兼容和不兼容两种情况下的优化模型,探讨双寡头支付平台的兼容性策略选择问题。研究发现,规模对称的双寡头支付平台兼容之后,两家支付平台的利润、消费者效用及社会福利均会增加;银联成立后中国工商银行的银行卡业务利润得以提升也验证了模型结果。建议政府借鉴银联的成功经验,使银联在线成为各支付平台的聚合型平台,提高第三方支付清算系统的效率。By constructing an optimization model about the duopoly payment platform under the compatible condition and assuming that network externalities utility is a non-linear function according to the Metcalfe＇ s law.This article studies the compatibility selection strategy of the duopoly payment platform.The results show that after being compatible of the scale symmetry duopoly payment platforms,theprofits,consumer utility and social welfare of platforms will both increase.The expansion of card business of ICBC has proved this conclusion.This paper suggests the government learn from the successful experience of Unionpay and transfer Unionpay Online payment platform to become aggregate type in order to improve the efficiency of the payment settlement system.

关 键 词：支付平台 兼容 非线性效应 网络外部性 双寡头 在线支付 

分 类 号：F49[经济管理—产业经济] F83