贷款风险补偿机制实施中政府与银行间的演化博弈研究  

A Study on the Evolutionary Game between Government and Bank in the Implementation of Loan Risk Compensation Mechanism

作　　者：陈华丰[1] 张目[1] 

机构地区：[1]贵州财经大学金融学院,贵州贵阳550025

出　　处：《科技创业月刊》2017年第10期97-100,共4页Journal of Entrepreneurship in Science & Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"贷款风险补偿资金对科技型中小企业信贷配给的影响机理研究"(项目编号:71263011);贵州财经大学2016年度在校学生资助项目"贷款风险补偿机制下科技型中小企业信用风险感知及个主体间博弈仿真研究"

摘　　要：科技型中小企业的发展将增强我国的科技创新能力,推动我国经济的增长,但由于它自身的特点导致其融资十分困难。为促进科技型中小企业融资,文章基于演化博弈理论,建立了政府与银行的演化博弈模型对贷款风险补偿资金的设立进行了探讨,分析了模型的8种演化情况的稳定性。结果发现,对银行来说增加贷款收益,减少贷款成本能更好的促进与政府的合作;对政府来说减少管理成本和贷款利息补偿能推动其设立贷款风险补偿资金。The development of small and medium-sized enterprises of science and technology will enhance China^s scientific and technological innovation ability, promote the growth of ChinaJs economy, but because of its own characteristics lead to its financing is very difficult. In order to promote the financing of small and medium- sized enterprises, this paper based on the evolutionary game theory, established the evolutionary game model of government and bank to discuss the establishment of loan risk compensation funds, and analyzed the stability of the eight evolutionary models. The results showed that the bank to increase the loan income, reduce the cost of loans can better promote cooperation with the government. For the government to reduce management costs and loan interest compensation can promote the establishment of loan risk compensation funds.

关 键 词：科技型中小企业 贷款风险补偿资金 政府 商业银行 演化博弈 稳定性分析 

分 类 号：F830.5[经济管理—金融学]