农业支持保护补贴政策效应研究——基于农户策略选择的博弈经济分析  

Effect Study of the Chinese Policy for Agricultural Support and Protection Based on the Game Analysis of Farmers' Strategy Choice

作　　者：王莉[1] 周密[1] 

机构地区：[1]湘潭大学商学院,湖南湘潭411005

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2017年第3期130-134,共5页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目(12&ZDO52);国家社会科学基金重点项目(11AZD006);高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金(20124301110002);湖南省教育厅重点课题(17A039);湖南省教育厅重点课题(17A039);高等学校博士科点专项科研基金(20124301110002)

摘　　要：基于农户策略选择的博弈经济分析视角,考量农业支持保护补贴政策效应。结果表明:在种粮收益低于务工收益的情况下,现有政策无法实现政策预期。鉴此,宜调整补贴政策,在综合考虑农民利益基础上,奖惩并重,引导规模化经营,促进土地流转。Based on the perspective of economic analysis for the game of farmers＇strategy choice, this paper studied the effect of Chinese subsidy policy for agricultural support and protec- tion.The results showed that：in the case of grain yield lower than the income as a worker in cit- ies,these expected objectives of current subsidy policy will not be achieved.In view of this,these subsidy policies should be adjusted,mete out rewards and punishments at the same time in terms of comprehensive consideration of the interests of farmers, guide in the scaled business, and pro- mote the land circulation.

关 键 词：农业补贴政策 效应 博弈 

分 类 号：F304.8[经济管理—产业经济]