基于演化博弈的农村劳动力迁移分析  

An Evolutionary Game Model Analysis of Rural Labor Force Transfer

作　　者：杨侃[1] 田双亮[1] 祝荃芃 

机构地区：[1]西北民族大学数学与计算机科学学院,兰州730030 [2]江西师范高等专科学校应用工程学院,江西鹰谭335000

出　　处：《重庆交通大学学报（社会科学版）》2017年第3期68-71,共4页Journal of Chongqing Jiaotong University:Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：国家民委科研项目"图的Merrifield-Simmons指标与Hosoya指标的计数及排序问题研究"(14XBZ018);中央专项资金资助研究生科研创新项目"模糊需求环境下供应商与零售商合作广告的博弈分析"(Yxm2016125)

摘　　要：运用博弈论的研究方法,通过构建农村劳动力迁移决策与政府鼓励迁移的动态演化博弈模型,分析影响系统演化路径的因素。研究结果表明:劳动力的迁移损失越小,越有利于劳动力迁移;劳动力城乡相对收入差距的大小对劳动力迁移有重要影响;农村劳动力迁移到城市以后获得的无形效用和福利越大,对劳动力迁移的吸引力越大;农村劳动力迁移过程中政府总成本支出与额外收益之差对其采取何种策略有重要影响。Game theory research methods are used by building rural labor transfer decisions and the government encourage trans- fer dynamic evolution game model. The factors influencing the evolution of the system path are analyzed. The results show： the less the labor transfer loss, the more conducive it is to labor transfer; Urban-rural size of the relative income gap between urban labor force and rural labor force plays a major impact on the labor transfer; the larger the intangible utility and benefits, the more attractive the labor force transfer; the total costs of the government in the process of rural labor transfer and extra income differ- ence has an important influence on its strategy taking.

关 键 词：农村劳动力迁移 政府鼓励 演化博弈 演化稳定策略 

分 类 号：F323.6[经济管理—产业经济]