连锁董事网络对公司风险承担的影响  

The Effect of Interlocking Director Network on Corporate Risk Taking

作　　者：刘衡[1] 苏坤[2] Heng Liu Kun Su(Lingnan College, Sun gat-sen University School of Management, Northwestern Pol ytechnical University)

机构地区：[1]中山大学岭南学院 [2]西北工业大学管理学院

出　　处：《经济学报》2017年第1期119-140,共22页China Journal of Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71402141;71672197);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金(14YJC790103);中国博士后科学基金项目(2015M582705;2016T90943);陕西省博士后科研项目(2016BSHYDZZ47)资助

摘　　要：以我国沪、深两市上市公司为研究对象,借助社会网络分析方法量化连锁董事网络密度,研究了连锁董事网络对公司风险承担的影响,以及市场化进程和投资机会对上述关系的调节作用。研究表明:连锁董事具有良好的信息传递功能,提高了企业间风险承担行为模仿学习的可能性和实施进程,连锁董事网络密度与公司风险承担显著正相关;市场化进程的提高有助于连锁董事信息传递功能的发挥,在市场化进程较高的地区连锁董事网络对公司风险承担的影响相对更强;充足的投资机会为连锁董事功能的发挥提供了适宜的土壤,有助于增强连锁董事网络对公司风险承担的促进作用。研究结果丰富和拓展了连锁董事网络和公司风险承担的相关研究。Using a corporate-level dataset of Chinese listed companies, this paper quantizes the density of interlocking director network based on the social network analysis method, and studies the effect of interlocking director network on corporate risk taking, as well as the moderate effect of marketization and investment opportunity. The results show that： the interlocking director has good information dissemination role, can raise the possibility of imitating risk taking behavior among the network and its implementation process. The density of interlocking director network is significantly positively related to corporate risk taking. The improvement of marketization helps to play the information dissemination role of interlocking director. There is a stronger effect of interlocking director network on corporate risk taking in better developed regions relatively to less developed regions. Sufficient investment opportunity provides suitable soil for the effect of interlocking director, helps to strength the promoting effect of interlocking director on corporate risk- taking. This paper enriches and expands the related research on interlocking director network and corporate risk taking.

关 键 词：风险承担 连锁董事 市场化进程 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F271F272.3