信息不对称条件下的需求延迟研究  

Research on Demand Delay under Asymmetric Information

作　　者：王博文[1] 王琳[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072

出　　处：《甘肃科学学报》2017年第3期147-152,共6页Journal of Gansu Sciences

摘　　要：从供应商的角度出发,研究了供应商和客户之间的信息不对称对需求延迟策略的影响。利用标准的委托代理框架对其建模,并根据贝叶斯模型预测需求信息,通过比较供应商在完备信息条件下与信息不对称条件下所提供的最优合同,分析信息不对称程度对供应商最优策略的影响。结果表明,当存在信息不对称时,供应商会增加初始生产力,且由于代理效应,需求延迟策略所产生的部分利润会从供应商转向客户;但当信息不对称程度降低时,代理效应的影响也会逐渐消失。From the supplier point of view, this paper studies the impact of asymmetric information be- tween suppliers and customers on demand postponement strategy. Use the principal--agent framework for this problem to build model, and according to Bias model to forecast demand, through the comparison of optimal contract from supplier under complete information conditions and asymmetric informalion,analy- zing the impact of information asymmetry on the supplier＇s optimal strategy. The results show that when there is asymmetric information,the suppliers will increase the initial productivity,and due to the agency effect,some of the profits generated by the postponement strategy will change from the supplier to the cus tomer. However, when the degree of information asymmetry decreases, the effect of agency effect will grad disappear.

关 键 词：需求延迟 信息不对称 需求更新信息 委托代理 

分 类 号：C935[经济管理—管理学]