认知内涵能够取代含义吗：评认知二维语义学对弗雷格含义理论的修正与辩护  

Can Epistemic Intension Substitute Sense: Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics' Revision of and Defense for Frege's Theory of Sense

作　　者：陈吉胜[1] 侯旎 

机构地区：[1]华中师范大学马克思主义学院,武汉430079 [2]南京大 哲学系,南京210023

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2017年第3期56-61,共6页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(CCNU16A06026)

摘　　要：查莫斯的认知二维语义学是对弗雷格主义语义学与克里普克主义语义学的一次整合。在认知二维语义框架内,认知内涵是含义的替代品,但是这种替代是存在困难的。因此,查莫斯定义出以认知内涵为基础的丰富化内涵,并认为,丰富化内涵不仅能够保留含义理论的主要原则,而且能够解决克里普克之谜。文章以克里普克之谜为基础提出了"新克里普克之谜",并论证指出,丰富化内涵不能够在解决新克里普克之谜的同时,保持弗雷格的语义精神。Chalmers＇ epistemic two-dimensional semantics is the integration of Fregean semantics and Kripkean se- mantics. In the frame of epistemic two-dimensional semantics, epistemic intension substitutes sense, but there is difficulty for the substitution. Therefore, Chalmers defines enriched intension based on epistemic intension. Ac- cording to Chalmers, not only can enriched intension retain the main principle of sense theory, but also it can re- solve Kripke＇ s puzzle. We raise neo-Kripke＇ s puzzle based on Kripke＇ s puzzle, and demonstrate that enriched in- tension cannot resolve neo-Kripke＇ s puzzle while keeping Frege＇ s semantic spirit.

关 键 词：舍义 认知内涵 丰富化内涵 认知意义 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]