重复对赌协议机制下企业两阶段融资博弈  

Game of the Enterprises' Two-Stage Financing Based on Repeated Valuation Adjustment Mechanism

作　　者：刘峰涛[1] 赵袁军[1] 刘玮[1] 

机构地区：[1]东华大学旭日工商管理学院,上海200051

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2017年第3期528-536,共9页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(CUSFDH-D-2015065);国家留学基金委资助项目(201506630047)

摘　　要：采用博弈论作为研究方法,在两阶段融资重复对赌情境下,全面探讨融资企业和投资方之间的决策行为,探讨投融资双方订立的对赌目标的严格程度和企业的努力水平对企业预期收益的影响,揭示对赌协议存在的潜在风险。同时,运用Matlab软件得出:采用重复对赌结构,企业达到业绩目标的概率值要小于一次对赌达到业绩目标的概率值。这对投融资双方而言都是有利的,当第1阶段结束时,双方均有权根据阶段性结果来选择是否继续博弈或调整条款继续博弈,可以有效克服短期利益的束缚和信息风险,避免由于一次性签约业绩目标过高所采取的冒险行为,对于双方的互惠互利具有重要作用。Using game theory, we discuss the decision-making behavior between the financing firms and the investors in the two stage situation, and discuss the influence of the level of investment and financing on the expected earnings of the firms, and identify the potential risks. Then using MatLab package, we show. through the repeated gambling structure, the probability of firms to achieve the performance target is less than once the probability of gambling to achieve performance goals. This is beneficial to both sides of the investment and financing. When the first stage ends, the two sides have the right to choose whether to continue the game or adjust the terms of the game, thus effectively overcomes the short-term interests of the constraints and information risk, avoids the risk of taking over a one-time contract performance, for both sides of mutual benefit.

关 键 词：对赌协议 博弈论 两阶段融资 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]