温室气体减排联盟及其稳定性分析——基于博弈论视角  

Greenhouse Gas Reductioncoalition and Its Stability Analysis——Based on the Perspective of Game Theory

作　　者：邓翔[1] 瞿小松[1] 

机构地区：[1]四川大学经济学院,成都610065

出　　处：《北京理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2017年第3期25-32,共8页Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology：Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目"结构宏观经济模型的估计与评价--基于新后验模拟方法"(71473168);国家自然科学基金资助项目"新兴市场经济周期与波动的特征及启示"(71473169)

摘　　要：虽然《巴黎协定》的签署为全球2020年后的气候治理行动指明了方向,但是依靠国家自主贡献减排的方式能否推动真正意义上的全球合作,进而达到2℃的温控目标仍然值得怀疑。从博弈论角度对各国的减排行动进行了重新审视,分别用单独联盟、京都联盟和广义联盟剖析了各国可能存在的合作减排模式。实证结果表明:只有单独联盟是稳定的,京都联盟和广义联盟都不稳定。认为,要实现最终的减排目标,各国的自主贡献减排力度仍需加大,而发达国家能否如实履约并提供相应的资金援助是关键。Although the Paris Agreement pointed out the direction for global climate governance after 2020,it is still questionableto meet the 2℃ temperature control goalrely on the intended nationally determined contribution （INDC）. This article reviewsevery national＇s emission reduce actions from the perspective of game theory,and classifies the cooperation mode into singleton coalition, Kyoto coalition and grand coalition.The empirical results show that onlysingleton coalition is stable,Kyoto coalition and grand coalitionare unstable.To achieve the ultimate target,the intended nationally determined contribution of all countries still need to be increased. Meanwhile,the keyis whether the developed countries can keep their promise and provide corresponding financial supporttruthfully.

关 键 词：巴黎协定 温室气体减排 合作联盟 自主贡献 

分 类 号：F205[经济管理—国民经济]