团体标准协调机理研究:一个动态分析  

Dynamic Analysis on the Coordination Mechanism of Group Standards

作　　者：王宇[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学工商管理学院

出　　处：《标准科学》2017年第5期33-37,54,共6页Standard Science

基　　金：国家社科基金年度一般项目(项目编号:15BJY002)资助

摘　　要：从标准经济学属性上,团体标准是介于事实标准和正式标准之间的一类标准。如何协调好事实标准和正式标准之间的选择关系是团体标准微观层面高效的关键。本文基于"囚徒困境"经典双人博弈模型,构建三阶段协调博弈模型分析团体标准在演化过程中事实标准与正式标准的协调选择问题。研究表明,在已知未来正式标准(即团体标准)优于事实标准以及正式标准的绩效高于事实标准的前提下,低折现和参与者缺乏耐心能够促成尽早"合作"。在此基础上,本文基于实际给出提高团体标准收益预期、加快标准版本更新速率和重视"小"企业等政策建议。On the standard economics attribute, group standard is a kind of standard between the fact and the formal standard. How to coordinate the selection between the facts and the formal standards is the key to the efficiency at the micro level of the group standards. Based on the classic double game model ＂prisoner＇s dilemma＂, this paper constructs the three-stage coordination game model to analyze the coordination between the group standard and the formal standard in the process of evolution. Research shows that under the premise of knowing the future formal standard （i.e. standard group） is better than the fact standard and the performance standard is higher than the formal de facto standard, low discount and lack of patience among the participators can facilitate the ＂cooperation＂ as soon as possible. Finally, based on the actual condition it gives the policy recommendations to improve the standard group revenue, speed up the update rate of the standard versions and pay attention to the ＂small＂ enterprises.

关 键 词：团体标准 动态博弈 协调机理 

分 类 号：F203[经济管理—国民经济]