基于信息共享水平的多供应商博弈研究  

Research on Multi-Supplier Game under Information Sharing

作　　者：夏维力[1] 多彦彦 姜继娇[1] XIA Weili DUO Yanyan JIANG Jijiao(School of Management, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an 710129, China)

机构地区：[1]西北工业大学管理学院,西安710129

出　　处：《科技与经济》2017年第3期81-84,95,共5页Science & Technology and Economy

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目--"异地分布式多SCRUM软件项目客户参与行为对团队敏捷性的作用机理研究"(项目编号:16YJA630068;项目负责人:殷茗)成果之一

摘　　要：在供应链共享信息的背景下,考虑两个供应商和一个零售商组成的供应链结构,研究多供应商定价策略问题。根据期望利润最大化建立供应链信息共享博弈模型,依据纳什均衡求解出供应商和零售商的最优定价,比较信息共享和不共享下供应链各节点的效益。结果表明:信息精度越高,供应商和零售商的定价越高。若竞争强度不变,供应商和零售商的利润都会随着信息精度的增加而增加。信息共享对供应商有利但不利于零售商,供应商需要支付相应的信息报酬才能激励零售商的信息共享行为。In the context of supply chain information sharing , a supply chain structure composed of two suppliers and one retailer is considered to study the multi-supplier pricing strategy problem. According to the expected profit maximization, and a supply chain information sharing game model is established . Based on the Nash equilibrium,the optimal pricing of suppliers and retailers is calculat - ed,and the benefits of each node in the supply chain are compared. The results show that higher accuracy of information leads to high-er pricing of suppliers and retailers . If the competition intensity is unchanged, suppliers and retailers’ profits will increase with the ac-curacy of information increases . Information sharing is good for suppliers but not for retailers . Suppliers need to pay the corresponding information to encourage retailers to share information.

关 键 词：信息共享 博弈定价 期望利润最大 纳什均衡 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F274