财政分权、晋升激励与预算软约束——基于政府过度负债省级政府数据的实证分析  

Fiscal Decentralization,Promotion Incentive and Soft Budget Constraint——An Empirical Analysis of Governmental Over-indebted Provincial Government Data

作　　者：张曾莲[1] 江帆[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京科技大学东凌经济管理学院,北京100083

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2017年第6期15-25,共11页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71302164)

摘　　要：选取2007-2014年30个省份的面板数据,采用动态面板回归与静态面板回归相结合的方法,实证研究了财政分权、晋升激励和预算软约束对地方政府经济行为的影响。研究发现,财政分权、晋升激励和预算软约束不仅与地方政府债务规模呈现出显著的正相关关系,而且三大要素的共同作用对地方政府债务规模的影响更为显著。这一结果为解决我国地方政府过度负债问题提供了思路。Based on the panel data of 30 provinces during 2007-2014, the paper studied empirically the influence of fiscal decentralization, promotion incentive and the soft budget constraint on the economic behavior of the local government by using the method of dynamic panel regression and static panel regression combination. The study found that fiscal decentralization, promotion incentives and soft budget constraints not only have a significant positive correlation with the size of local government debt, but also the influence of the interaction of the three elements on the local government debt scale is more significant. This result provides a way to solve the problem of excessive debt of local governments in China.

关 键 词：地方政府债务 财政分权 晋升激励 预算软约束 

分 类 号：F812[经济管理—财政学]