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机构地区:[1]北京科技大学会计系
出 处:《科学决策》2017年第5期19-39,共21页Scientific Decision Making
基 金:国家自科基金青年项目(项目编号:71302164)
摘 要:政府债务规模和风险是一级政府关注的重点问题。从财政分权和省级官员特征两个维度,本文考察了地方政府债务规模的影响因素,并在此基础上进一步研究财政分权程度和省级官员特征对地方政府债务规模的交互影响作用。通过2010-2014年30个省级政府的实证数据进行混合OLS回归,研究发现财政分权程度越高,地方政府债务规模越小。省级官员的年龄过大或过小都会使地方政府债务规模的减小,同时具有企业工作背景的省长和省委书记也会抑制地方政府债务规模的扩张,并且财政分权和省级官员特征对地方政府债务规模的影响是相互促进的。据此提出建议,合理控制地方政府债务膨胀。The scale and risk of government debt are the focus of the government. From the two dimensions of fiscal decentralization and official characteristics, this paper examines the factors affecting the size of local government debt, and further studies the interaction of fiscal decentrali- zation and official characteristics on local government debt scale. Through mixed OLS regression of 30 provincial governments in 2010-2014, we find that the higher the degree of fiscal decentrali- zation, the smaller the size of local government debt. Provincial officials are too old or too smafl will make the size of the local government debt reduction, while the background of the work of the provincial govemor and provincial party secretary will also inhibit the expansion of local govern- ment debt scale; and the effects of fiscal decentralization and official characteristics on the scale of local govemment debt are mutually reinforcing. According to the results, we make recommen- dations to control local government debt expansion.
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