两主两从博弈下的装备维修器材供应链协调研究  

Study on Supply Chain Coordination of Equipment Repair Equipment with Two Leaders-Followers Game

作　　者：林翔[1] 

机构地区：[1]海军装备研究院,北京100161

出　　处：《兵器装备工程学报》2017年第5期140-143,168,共5页Journal of Ordnance Equipment Engineering

摘　　要：以相互竞争的两条装备维修器材供应链作为研究背景,提出了一种基于Stackelberg主从博弈的激励协调模型,并通过最优反应动态思想给出求解该模型的一般思路,结合粒子群优化算法对军事算例进行仿真,对比分析供应商合作与非合作下的计算结果,供应商非合作下奖金激励策略可以有效实现供应链协调,但供应商若能实现合作,将使供应商达到利益最优化,可忽略奖金激励的影响。Take the competitive two supply chain of equipment repair equipment as the research background, a kind of incentive coordination model based on the Stackelberg game is proposed, and the general idea of solving the model is given by using the best response dynamics theory. Through the application of the particle swarm optimization algorithm （ PSO ）, the simulated ＂results of the military example on the suppliers cooperation and non cooperation are analyzed to show that the incentive strategy under the non cooperation can effectively achieve the coordination of the supply chain, but if the suppliers to get the cooperation, it will enable the suppliers to achieve the best interests of the optimization and the bonus incentive is no longer the key.

关 键 词：装备维修器材 Stackelberg主从博弈 供应链 最优反应动态 粒子群优化算法 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]