基于议价模型的航空联盟动态转让价格研究  

Research on Transfer Price of Airline Alliance Based on Bargaining Model

作　　者：顾颖菁 朱金福[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学民航学院,江苏南京211106

出　　处：《华东交通大学学报》2017年第3期53-59,72,共8页Journal of East China Jiaotong University

基　　金：江苏省博士生科研创新基金(KYLX_0292)

摘　　要：随着全球经济一体化的发展,航空联盟的不断加深,航空联盟成员如何合理地分配收益已经成为航空公司研究的重要问题。用讨价还价动态博弈法研究了航空联盟中市场航空公司与承运航空公司在完全信息与非完全信息下的转让价格问题,并建立了非完全信息下按比例分配多阶段议价模型。研究结果表明:讨价还价博弈下的转移价格能够激励航空公司的销售,市场航空公司在不完全信息情况下,会获得较高收益;承运航空公司在非完全信息下,会获得较高收益。非完全信息下按比例分配多阶段议价模型弥补了现有分配方式不足,既保证有利于航空联盟的票不被拒绝,也确保航空公司的利益不会减少。With the development of global economic integration and the deepening of aviation alliance, a major issue that needs to be addressed is how to share the revenue generated from selling tickets for products among the individual airlines. Through the theory of bargaining dynamic game, this paper analyzed the transfer price between marketing airline and operating airline with complete and incomplete information and established the multi-stage bargaining model of proportional distribution with incomplete information. The results showed that the transfer price based on bargaining game can encourage airlines to sell tickets, and marketing airlines yield high revenues with incomplete information. Conversely, operating airlines get higher transfer price with incomplete information than that of complete information. This model remedies the limitation of the existing distributive pattern, which may guarantee the enterprises＇ interest.

关 键 词：航空联盟 转移价格 动态博弈 议价模型 

分 类 号：F562[经济管理—产业经济]