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作 者:薛凤[1] 陈绍刚[2] XUE Feng CHEN Shao-gang(Chengdu College of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China)
机构地区:[1]电子科技大学成都学院文理系,四川成都611731 [2]电子科技大学数学科学学院,四川成都611731
出 处:《数学的实践与认识》2017年第10期59-66,共8页Mathematics in Practice and Theory
基 金:四川省教育厅科研项目(16ZB0449)"竞争状态下基于随机需求的两类价格歧视交互效应的研究";国家统计局统计信息技术与数据挖掘重点开放实验室重点项目(SDL201603)"半参数空间计量模型的理论研究与应用"
摘 要:基于随机需求函数,讨论了相互竞争的两厂商实施三度价格歧视无限次重复博弈和不定次重复博弈的均衡分析,在三度价格歧视无限次重复博弈分析中,得出了两厂商在贴现因子影响下的子博弈完美纳什均衡.在三度价格歧视不定次重复博弈分析中,设计了不同的方案并进行了Matlab仿真,比较了不同贴现因子下不同仿真方案的厂商得益,并对仿真结果进行了系统分析,得到了统计意义下的均衡分析.Based on the random demand function, the paper discussed equilibrium analysis under two competing manufacturers when they enforce the third-degree price discrimination through infinitely repeated game and Indefinite repeated game. In the analysis of third-degree price discrimination under the infinite repeated game, two competing manufacturers obtained the sub-game perfect nash equilibrium under different discount factor. In the analysis of thirddegree price discrimination under the infinitely repeated game, the paper designed different schemes and carried out the computer simulation. Besides, obtained the manufacturers benefit under' the conditions of different discount factors. Finally, the paper analyzes the results of every simulation plan and works out the critical discount rate and equilibrium strategy in the statistical sense.
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