提高竞争对手成本理论的法经济学分析及其对专利许可反垄断规制的影响  

A Legal and Economic Analysis for Raising Rivals' Costs Theory and its Influence on Antitrust Regulation of Patent Licensing

作　　者：田辰[1] 

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学竞争法中心

出　　处：《电子知识产权》2017年第5期12-23,共12页Electronics Intellectual Property

摘　　要：纵向限制行为兼具促进竞争和抑制竞争两方面属性。如:排他性交易、搭售、拒绝交易等具有排他性策略性质的纵向限制行为,一直是困扰反垄断法理论研究和具体实践的难点。上世纪八十年代后,随着提高竞争对手成本理论的提出,解决这方面问题逐渐趋向于精细化、标准化。概括地说,该理论从"竞争者"成本是否被实质性提高这一角度出发,继而着眼于"市场竞争"范畴,最终对能够决定纵向限制行为是否具有竞争危害性的市场条件进行了回应。而近年来,专利许可中的排他性策略问题逐渐引起竞争关注,围绕该领域的相关案件和学术讨论日益增多。同样地,提高竞争对手成本理论在分析专利许可领域类似问题的过程中也发挥着积极作用,典型的司法判例及反垄断执法机构的政策中都体现出该理论。Vertical restraints have two aspects： promoting competition and restraining competition. Such as exclusive dealing, tying, refusal to deal and so on, those vertical restraints which have the nature of exclusion, are obstacles to both antitrust theoretical research and practice. After 1980s, with the advent of Raising Rivals＇ Costs （RRC） theory, the solution to this kind of problern tends to be refined and standardized. Generally speaking, RRC theory firstly set off from the perspective of whether costs of the ＂competitors＂ will be substantially increased, and then focus on ＂market competition＂, finally make a series of detailed response to those market factors and conditions which could determine the nature of vertical restraints. In recent years, issues of exclusive strategies during the process of patent licensing have gradually attracted more and more competitive attentions. In the same way, RRC theory will play an active role in this area as well, which has been reflected in some typical judicial precedents and some policies enacted by Anti-Monopoly Law enforcement agencies.

关 键 词：提高竞争对手成本理论 排他性策略 封锁效果 合理原则 专利许可 

分 类 号：D922.294[政治法律—经济法学]