资源诅咒寻租与冲突传导机制的博弈分析  

Game Analysis on Resource Curse Transmission Channel of Rent-seeking and Conflict

作　　者：姜昕[1] 韩樱[1] 张乃凡 

机构地区：[1]西北农林科技大学经济管理学院,陕西杨凌712100

出　　处：《国土资源科技管理》2017年第3期81-88,共8页Scientific and Technological Management of Land and Resources

基　　金：教育部人文社科青年基金项目(15YJC630029);西北农林科技大学基本科研业务费项目(2015RWYB07)

摘　　要："资源诅咒"可以通过多种传导机制对经济造成负面影响,而资源尤其是点资源所包含的大量租金诱使人们把很多资金和人力投入到毫无产出的寻租活动中,并且引发激烈的对抗性冲突、破坏和平的生产环境、降低生产效率,便是其中两项重要的传导机制。通过构建博弈模型解释了这两项传导机制的作用原理,并与我国当前资源开发过程中出现的一些问题相结合,提出通过改革资源税税制、控制租金的使用方向来杜绝寻租的源头,以及通过建立中央与地方共赢的利益协调机制来平息纷争的解决方案。以期及时规避资源诅咒,实现租金的有效利用、经济的平稳发展、利益的公平分配和环境的充分保护等多重目标。Resource curse can have a negative impact on the economy through a variety of different transmission channels. This paper explains two transmission channels by constructing the game model. One is rent-seeking, which means that the large amount of rents in natural resources, especially ＂point resources＂, induce people to put a great deal of money and labors in non-output rent-seeking activities. The other one is conflict, which means that above rent-seeking behaviors will lead to intense confrontational conflicts, destroy the peaceful production environment and reduce production efficiency. The author tries to explain these two transmission mechanisms by constructing the game model and combine with problems occurring in the process of resource exploitation in our country, so as to put forward some solutions, which are composed of two aspects：The first is to propose to reform present resource tax system,control the usage of rent so as to depress for rent-seeking; the second is to establish a profit coordination system and win-win relations people＇ hip bet s motivation ween central government and local government so as to resolve conflicts. All in all, this paper is trying to realize targets of avoiding resources curse in time to achieve effective use of rent,the steady development the fair distribution of interests and the full protection of environment.

关 键 词：资源诅咒 资源型经济 寻租 冲突 利益协调机制 

分 类 号：F062.1[经济管理—政治经济学]