总量-交易机制下制造商占优的供应链减排博弈分析  

作　　者：郭继东[1] 马书刚[2] 

机构地区：[1]防灾科技学院经济管理系 [2]河北经贸大学商学院

出　　处：《企业经济》2017年第6期17-22,共6页Enterprise Economy

基　　金：河北省社会科学基金项目"京津冀城市物流低碳化发展路径研究"(项目编号:HB16GL006)

摘　　要：本文在碳排放总量-交易机制下,考虑碳减排的投资成本效应、产品销量的碳减排效应,以及碳市场价格与碳排放总量之间的反向关系,构建了供应链成员之间的Stackelberg博弈模型,并解析求解得到了模型均衡解,同时采用数值仿真对模型中关键参数灵敏度进行了分析,以研究制造商占优型供应链碳减排协调优化问题。结果表明:强制产品碳足迹认证,并通过政策激励和宣传,提升消费者的低碳意识,可以明显促进供应链系统碳减排及其稳定性;发展绿色能源,多渠道资金投入,有助于提升制造商低碳技术投资的积极性;政府对于企业初始碳排放配额分配必须谨慎,碳市场价格应由市场供需确定,以抑制碳市场过度投机行为。Under the carbon Cap-and-Trade scheme, a low-carbon supply chain Stackelberg game model is established with carbon emission technology investment cost effect, product sales effect to carbon emission rate, and reverse relation between produet retail price and carbon emission cap taken into consideration. To study such a manufacturing-leading supply chain carbon emission reduction coordination control, analytical solution is applied to obtain equilibria of the model. Meanwhile, numerical simulations are done to analyze sensitivity for key parameters of the system. Results indicate that compulsory carbon footprint certification and incentive policies to enhance customers＂ low-carbon consciousness can help improve e- mission reduction rate and systematical stability; green energy development and multi-channel social capital participation will benefit initiative of carbon emission reduction investment for manufacturers; it must be prudent when governments distribute carbon emission quotas; carbon trading prices shall well fit the market supply and demand, and excessive speculation behaviors shall be controlled.

关 键 词：总量-交易机制 碳排放 供应链 博弈 仿真 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]