非正式制度对农户道德风险行为影响的实证分析——基于389户农户的调查  

Impact of Informal Institution on Farmer's Moral Hazard:An Empirical Analysis Based on Surveys of 389 Households

作　　者：李学荣[1] 张利国[1] 

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学鄱阳湖生态经济研究院,江西南昌330032

出　　处：《农林经济管理学报》2017年第3期334-342,共9页Journal of Agro-Forestry Economics and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71263018;71663025);中国博士后科学基金(2013T60236;2012M510700);江西省社会科学规划基金(13GL06);江西省现代农业及其优势产业可持续发展的决策支持协调创新中心课题(XDNYA1507);江西省研究生创新项目(YC2015-B060)

摘　　要：农户道德风险行为的发生严重影响农产品质量安全,如何防范农户道德风险行为是当前研究的焦点。借助半参数Logistic回归模型,以389户农户调查数据为样本,重点研究非正式制度对农户道德风险行为的影响。结果表明,非正式制度负向影响农户道德风险行为。其中,"村规民约制定情况"变量的边际效应为-0.133,说明所在村庄制定了村规民约的农户,其道德风险行为发生的可能性越低;"道德观念约束力"变量的边际效应为-0.161,说明在开展农业生产活动中,认为道德观念约束力越强的农户,道德风险行为发生的可能性越低。从充分发挥村规民约作用、增强农户道德观念和加大政府规制力度等方面提出政策建议。Farmers5 morally hazardous behavior seriously affects the quality and safety of agro-products. How to prevent such behavior is the focuses of current research. A semi-parametric logistic model was used to investigate the impact of informal institution on farmers’ morally hazardous behavior based on the survey data of 389 households.The results reveal that iniormal institution has a negative impact. Among them, the marginal effect of “village regulation implement situation” variable is -0.133,which implies that the probability of mor-al hazard decreases if village regulations are established, and “ the restraining force of moral idea” is -0.161, indicating that the probability of moral hazard decreases if farmers think that moral idea has higher restraining force while carrying out agricultural production activities.And policy recommendations were given to make full use ol the role ol village regulation to enhance farmers, moral idea and intensify government regulation.

关 键 词：农户道德风险 非正式制度 半参数Logistic模型 农产品质量安全 

分 类 号：F326.5[经济管理—产业经济]