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作 者:高翔[1] 黄建忠[2] 蒙英华[2] GAO Xiang HUANG Jianzhong MengYinghua
机构地区:[1]厦门大学经济学院 [2]上海对外经贸大学国际经贸学院,201620
出 处:《国际贸易问题》2017年第6期94-104,共11页Journal of International Trade
基 金:教育部哲学社会科学研究重大项目"要素成本上升背景下我国外贸中长期发展趋势研究"(13JZD010);国家社科基金项目"区域服务贸易协定效应测算及政治经济学解释研究"(16BJL088)
摘 要:本文在考虑以环境成本和贪腐成本为代表的非期望产出情况下,核算了中国省级地方政府的治理能力,结合2000-2006年的中国工业企业数据库和中国海关贸易数据库,从出口企业、出口产品、出口市场和出口价格4个维度研究了政府治理对中国企业出口边际的动态影响。研究结果表明:政府治理虽然显著促进了企业出口集约边际,却也显著抑制了企业出口扩展边际,政府治理对中国出口增长的带动更多体现在"量"而非"质"上;这一结论在考虑企业资本密集度、所有制属性和贸易方式后呈现出显著的差别化特征;政府治理能力和企业生产率间存在显著的交互效应,纳入政企间的交互影响后,中国出口企业的"生产率悖论"并不存在。Based on the consideration of environmental costs and corruption costs as the representative of the non-expected output, together with 2000-2006 Chinese industrial enterprise database and Chinese Customs Trade data, we esti- mate the dynamic effects of Chinese provincial governance capacity of local gov- ernment on the margin of Chinese export enterprises from the four dimensions of export enterprises, export products, export market and export price. The main find- ingsare as follows: Although the government promotes the export intensive mar- gin, it also inhibitsthe export expansion margin, the promote effect is more em- bodied in the "quantity" rather than"quality". This conclusion changes significant- ly after taking capital intensity, ownership and trademanners into consideration. In addition, we also find that there is a significant interaction between government governance capacity and enterprise productivity, and the "productivity paradox" of China's export enterprises does not exist after considering the interaction between the government and the enterprise.
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