不同经济背景下央行沟通 对通胀预期的非对称影响  

Asymmetric Effects of Central Bank Communication on Inflation Expectations Under Different Economic Backgrounds

作　　者：史焕平[1] 李泽成 

机构地区：[1]华东交通大学经济管理学院,江西南昌330013 [2]宜春市工业与信息化委员会,江西宜春336000

出　　处：《经济问题》2017年第7期37-45,共9页On Economic Problems

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"央行沟通与实际干预工具的组合匹配及其转换时机"(13BJY173)

摘　　要：构建理论模型以刻画不同经济背景下央行沟通对公众通胀预期的非对称影响,在此基础上运用2001-2014年的季度经济数据并应用MSVAR模型进行实证检验。结果表明:不同经济背景下我国央行沟通对通胀预期的影响具有非对称性。在经济衰退时期,央行沟通后经济主体通胀预期水平的变动并不显著,即表明央行沟通引导公众通胀预期的效果较差,不能够有效地引导经济主体形成合理的通胀预期;而在经济繁荣时期,央行沟通后经济主体通胀预期水平的变动幅度较大,表明央行沟通引导公众通胀预期的效果较好,能够有效地引导经济主体形成合理的通胀预期。The paper constructs a theoretical model to describe the different background of economy central bank communication asymmetric impact on the public inflation expectations, based on using 2001 -2014 quarter econom- ic data and using the MSVAR model for an empirical test. The results show that the impact of China＇ s central bank communication on the inflation expectations in different economic backgrounds is asymmetric. During the period of economic recession, the central banks communicate economic subject inflation expectations level change is not obvi- ous, that central bank communication guide public inflation expectations are less effective, can＇ t effectively guiding economic main body to form a reasonable expectations of inflation ; and in a period of economic prosperity, the cen- tral banks communicate after the economic subject inflation expectations level changes in the magnitude of the lar- ger, indicating that the central bank communication guide public inflation expectations effect is better, and it can effectively guide the economic subject to form the reasonable expectations of inflation.

关 键 词：央行沟通 通胀预期 MSVAR模型 非对称影响 

分 类 号：F810.2[经济管理—财政学]