考虑消费者环境偏好和制造商风险规避的定价策略分析  

Pricing Strategy Analysis Considering Consumer Environmental Preference and Risk Aversion

作　　者：陈玙[1] 钱钢[1] 沈玲玲[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]南京师范大学计算机科学与技术学院,江苏南京210023 [2]南京师范大学商学院,江苏南京210023

出　　处：《南京师范大学学报（工程技术版）》2017年第2期87-92,共6页Journal of Nanjing Normal University(Engineering and Technology Edition)

摘　　要：近年来环境问题已成为人们需要迫切解决的问题,如何鼓励制造商生产高绿色度产品也成为各国面临的一大难题.本文以生产不同绿色度产品的制造商之间的博弈为背景,考虑消费者的环境偏好、制造商的风险规避、产品绿色度以及政府补贴等因素,建立双寡头垄断的Cournot静态博弈模型,并利用均值-方差理论,确定各制造商的最优价格.最后进行数值仿真,探讨消费者环境偏好和制造商的风险规避对产品价格的影响.结果表明:在其他条件不变的情况下,消费者的环境偏好增加、政府补贴增长以及生产商的风险规避度升高都能导致产品价格降低,产品价格的降低可以促使企业提升产品的绿色度.这些结论可以为制造商生产决策提供参考价值和指导意义.Recently, the environment has become an urgent problem. How to encourage manufacturers to produce highgreen products is a major problem faced by all countries. We propose the Cournot game model manufacturer＇s optimal pricing decision by using the mean variance the against tlie background of game analysis be-tween manufacturers witli diferent product greennes, considering consumer environmental preference, the ufacturer risl^ aversion, product greennes and government＇ s subsidies. Finaiy, the numerical simuladiscuss the effect of consumer environmental preference and manufacturer risk aversion. Results show that, when the other factors are constants, the price will decrease as the consumer environmental preference, manugovernment subsidies increased. The lowering of the price can improve greenness of the products. All of these conclusions provide a reference and guiding for the manufacturers to make the final decision.

关 键 词：环境偏好 风险规避 政府补贴 绿色供应链 博弈 

分 类 号：C939[经济管理—管理学]