生态环境损害赔偿的博弈分析  

Game Theoretical Analysis on Ecological Damage Compensation

作　　者：袁亮[1] 何伟军[1,2] Dagmawi Mulugeta Degefu 沈菊琴[1,4] 

机构地区：[1]河海大学商学院,南京211100 [2]三峡大学经济与管理学院,湖北宜昌443002 [3]三峡大学水利与环境学院,湖北宜昌44300 [4]河海大学环境会计与资产管理研究所,南京211100

出　　处：《统计与决策》2017年第13期47-51,共5页Statistics & Decision

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71203123);国家社会科学基金资助项目(13BMZ057;14CMZ034);江苏省普通高校研究生科研创新计划项目(KYLX15-0517)

摘　　要：为了破解我国在环境保护方面存在的"企业污染、群众受害、政府买单"的困局,文章在"谁使用谁付费、谁保护谁收益"原则的指导下提出由造成生态环境污染的企业向政府进行赔偿来修复受损的生态环境。基于生态资本的自我增殖和时间价值,在传统的"零净损失"的政策目标下提出一种新的生态赔偿的政策目标。通过静态贝叶斯博弈分析发现:由于双方存在信息不对称,企业对政府政策目标的不确定性改变了政府的效用函数,双方对自身利益最大化的追求将导致两者产生冲突。最后提出完善企业与政府之间的生态环境损害赔偿制度的建议。In order to tackle the dilemma that the government takes the responsibility for the enterprises pollution which makes people suffer too much, this paper, under the guidance of whoever-uses-must-pay and whoever-protects-reaps-benefit principle, proposes a policy that the enterprises that produce environment pollution should compensate the government for the damaged ecological environment repair. Based on the time value and the self-improving value of the ecological capital, and the traditional ＂no-net-loss＂ policy goal, the paper designs a new ecological compensation policy objective. The paper also uses static Bayesian game to make analyses and finds out that because of the information asymmetries the uncertainty of the enterprises about the government＇s policy objectives changes the government＇s utility function, and that the pursuit of self-interest maximization leads to a conflict between the government and the private companies. Finally, the paper raises suggestions to improve the ecologi- cal environment damage compensation system.

关 键 词：政策目标 生态资本 损害赔偿 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F205[经济管理—国民经济]