基于内生制度变迁理论的收入分配分析  

Analysis of Income Distribution Based on the Endogenous Institutional Change Theory

作　　者：周留征[1] 刘江宁[2] 王明雁[3] ZHOU Liuzheng LIU Jiangning WANG Mingyan(Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875 Peking University, Beijing 100871 Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070)

机构地区：[1]北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院 [2]北京大学马克思主义学院 [3]首都经济贸易大学经济学院

出　　处：《经济与管理研究》2016年第6期20-26,共7页Research on Economics and Management

摘　　要：本文通过建立收入分配博弈模型将收入分配制度内生化,进而分析管理者和普通员工在收入分配制度的决定过程中起到的不同作用,以给管理者制定收入分配制度提供启示。模型分析结果表明,普通员工越强硬,且其威胁的可信度越高,其执行威胁所付出的成本越小,其在博弈中对管理者的策略选择就会造成更大的影响,从而迫使管理者更倾向于选择有利于普通员工的收入分配制度。Through establishing a game model of income distribution based on the endogenous institutional change theory, the paper analyses the different role of the managers and ordinary employees in the decision making process of the income distribution system, and provides enlightenment for the managers in establishing the income distribution system Game result shows that the tougher the average employee gets, the higher the credibility of the threat is, the smaller the cost of its execution is, and the greater the impact on the managers＇ strategy choice is ,which forces the managers to choose the income distribution system in favour of ordinary employees

关 键 词：内生制度变迁 收入分配 博弈 

分 类 号：F124.7[经济管理—世界经济]